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COMMENTS
AUDITORS' THIRD PARTY LIABILITY: AN
ILL-CONSIDERED EXTENSION OF THE LAW
INTRODUCTION
In recent years numerous legal commentators have advocated an
expansion of auditors' liability to users of financial statements,1 and
the courts have begun to find liability in situations where it would have
2
been unthinkable in earlier decades.
This expanded liability has had two express aims: improved disclosure
of financial information to investors,3 and restitution to investors who
are injured by misleading financial statements4 and who cannot obtain
restitution from the corporation itself.5 The advocates of increased
1. See, e.g., Bradley, Auditor's Liability and the Need for Accounting Uniformity, 30
LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 898 (1965); Solomon, Ultramares Revisited: A Modern Study
of Accountants' Liability to the Public, 18 DE PAUL L. REV. 56 (1968); Wyatt, Auditors'
Responsibilities, 12 ST. LoUIs LJ. 331 (1968); Comment, Accountants' Liabilities to
Third Parties Under Common Law and Federal Securities Law, 9 B.C. IND. & Com. L.
Ray. 137 (1967); Note, Accountants' Liabilities for False and Misleading Financial
Statements, 67 CoLum. L. REv. 1437 (1967); Comment, Auditors' Responsibility for
Misrepresentation:Inadequate Protection for Users of Financial Statements, 44 WASH.
L. REv. 139 (1968); 41 ST. J oN's L. REv. 588 (1967); 23 U. Mr~pam L. REv. 256 (1968);
23 VAND. L. REv. 809 (1970). Although the ideas of these articles are not novel to the
late 60's, earlier articles were certainly less frequent. See, e.g., 36 IowA L. REv. 319
(1951). Moreover, not all of the articles on the subject of auditors' liability unquestionably
accepted its expansion as desirable. See Note, Accountants' Liability for Nondisclosure
of After-Acquired Information: Strict Liability Under Rule lOb-5? 22 RUTGERS L. REv.
554 (1968), dealing with the Yale Express case (Fischer v. Kletz, 266 F. Supp. 180
(S.D.N.Y. 1967)), where the author passed no judgement on the potential expansion of
liability; Katsoris, Accountants' Third Party Liability-How Far Do We Go? 36 FoRDHAm L. REv. 191 (1967), who even went so far as to question the wisdom of expanded
liability. At one place in his article, Professor Katsoris indicates that the idea of such
liability is debatable: "this controversy leaves the accountant in a state of turmoil as
to the practical economics of practicing his profession!' Id. at 219-20. Even these holdouts, however, seem to accept the increased liability as an inevitable and workable
alternative.
2. See notes 6-19 and accompanying text, infra.
3. See authorities in note 1, supra. All of the commentators listed there subscribed
to this view to some extent.
4. See, e.g., Note, 67 CoLtm. L. Ray., supra note 1, at 1468 (1967).
5. To date, the major cases brought under the Securities Acts have been brought
after the demise of the businesses in question. See note 13 infra. Thus, the enterprises
whose auditors have been challenged have themselves lacked sufficient resources to
compensate injured investors. Moreover, the liabilities have uniformly been beyond the
ability of the corporate officers and directors to meet from their personal resources.
In at least one of the major current suits involving auditors, however, there are
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liability and the courts, however, have not carefully considered all
of the major obstacles to the achievement of either of these goals, or
all the potential effects of the liability on the accounting profession
and the securities markets. This comment analyzes these goals and
potential effects, and concludes not only that the obstacles appear to be
insurmountable, but that expanded liability will probably result in
injury to the auditing profession, the issuers of corporate securities
and the investors in those securities.
I. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT
The liability of auditors to users of financial information has only
recently become one of the "expanding areas of the law." For thirty
years, most courts followed the decision in Ultramares Corp. v. Touche,
Niven & Co.,' where the New York Court of Appeals held that an
accountant would be liable for negligence only to those with whom he
was in privity of contract. This doctrine remained viable even though
other areas of liability that were governed by the same principles were
undergoing drastic reevaluation and change.T While auditors could be
held liable to third parties in cases of actual fraud,' the infrequency 9
indications that the officers and directors of the company, as well as the auditors, were
insured against this liability. At least at the present time, such insurance seems permitted
by the SEC, despite the bar to indemnification agreements included in Note to Rule 460
of the Securities Act of 1933, 17 CFR § 230.460 (Note (a)) (1971). SEC, GumEs FOR
PREPARATION AND FILING OF REGISTRATION STATEMENTS, SEC Securities Act Release
No. 4936 (1968), at ii 46(c). Although this release was concerned only with Registration
Statements under the Securities Act of 1933, it seems reasonable to assume that the
same policy would be applied to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.
At least one commentator, however, raises serious questions as to the continued availability of insurance for officers and directors against liability under the securities acts,
and argues that if the SEC does not prohibit such insurance, the courts should refuse
to enforce it as contrary to public policy. Comment, Insuring Corporate Executives
Against Liability Under Rule lob-5: First Principles and Second Thoughts, 63 Nw. U.L.
REv. 544 (1968).
6. 255 N.Y. 170, 174 N.E. 441 (1931).
7. See, e.g., Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 50
MneN. L. REv. 791 (1966). See also note 51, infra.
8. The opinion in Ultramaresstated:
[Olur holding does not emancipate accountants from the consequences of fraud.
It does not relieve them if their audit has been so negligent as to justify a finding
that they had no genuine belief in its adequacy, for this again is fraud.
225 N.Y. 170, 188, 174 N.E. 441, 448 (1931). See also O'Connor v. Ludlam, 92 F.2d
50 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 302 U.S. 758 (1937).
9. S. LEVY, ACCOUNTANTS' LEGAL REspoNsSmITy 44 (1954). One author suggests that
the dearth of suits against auditors was due to the virtual elimination of actual fraud.
Bentson, The Effectiveness and Effects of the SEC's Accounting Disclosure Requirements
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and difficulty in proving actual fraud 0 made suits against accountants
a rarity."
In the 1960's, however, many legal commentators presented strong
arguments for holding auditors liable for securities transactions losses
by third party users of financial statements who were not in privity of
contract with the auditors. 12 Numerous court actions then were instituted, based primarily upon the federal securities acts, and attempting
to hold auditing firms liable for such losses.13

56-58, in EcoNo3Ic PoLIcY

AND THE REGULATION oF CoapoRATE SECURITIES 23 (H.
Manne ed. 1969) [hereinafter cited as Manne].
10. The general requirements for a fraud action in the business sphere are stated in
RESTATEMNT oF TORTS §§ 525, 526 (1938). For examples of the application of those
requirements to auditors, see State Street Trust Co. v. Ernst, 278 N.Y. 104, 15 N.E.2d
416 (1938); Fidelity & Deposit Co. v. Atherton, 47 N.M. 443, 144 P.2d 157 (1943);
O'Connor v. Ludlam, 92 F.2d 50 (2d Cir), cert. denied, 302 U.S. 758 (1937). In the
latter case, in considering the omission of contingent liabilities from the financial statements, the court stated that "such an abuse was not fraud unless accompanied by an
intent to conceal." Id. at 56.
11. For a brief discussion of all major cases decided between Ultramares and the advent of the current cases, see Solomon, Appendix A, supra note 1, at 90 (1968).
12. See note 1, supra.
13. Three major cases have received a great deal of publicity. These are:
Escott v. BarChris Constr. Corp., 283 F. Supp. 643 (S.D.N.Y. 1968). The purchasers
of 5Y0% convertible subordinated debentures brought suit under § 11 of the Securities
Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1964), based on errors in the earnings per share figure and
current ratio in the registration statement for those debentures. The auditors, as well as
the other defendants, were found liable.
United States v. Simon, 425 F.2d 796 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1006
(1970). Two partners and a manager of the auditing firm which performed the
Continental Vending Machine audits were convicted of violations of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1001
and 1341, and § 32 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78ff (1964), for
knowingly filing and mailing false financial statements. The charges were based upon
misleading footnotes regarding loans from Continental Vending to an affiliate, Valley
Commercial Corporation.
Although this was a criminal case, David B. Isbell of Covington and Burling, Legal
Counsel for the AICPA, who prepared the amicus curiae briefs for the AICPA in Simon,
stated:
There is nothing ... in any of these respects which turns on the fact that the
case was criminal rather than civil.
This is to say that the specific implications of the case apply just as much to
civil litigation, the risk of civil responsibility, as to the risk of criminal liability.
D. Isbell, An Assessment of the Implications of the Continental Vending Case, paper
presented to the Spring Meeting of the Council of the AICPA, May 5, 1970.
Fischer v. Kletz, 266 F. Supp. 180 (S.D.N.Y. 1967). This action was brought under
§ 18(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78r(a) (1964), and Rule
10b-5 of that Act, 17 CFR § 240.10b-5 (1970), for failure to disclose information discovered subsequent to the close of the Yale Express audit during a management services
engagement. While this case has not yet gone to trial, the opinion denying a motion to
dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted expressly left
open the possibility that there was a cause of action under Rule lob-S.
Some other major actions are still awaiting trial, such as Carpenter v. Hall, Complaint,
CA. No. 68-H-738 (S.D. Tex., filed Aug. 23, 1968), where the trustee of Westec
Corporation seeks to hold the auditors liable under both the security acts and common
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The auditing profession responded to this threat of liability by accelerating its efforts to improve its standards and techniques, 4 and
by searching for other devices to evade the liability.' 5 The auditors'
concern appears to have been well-founded, and it now appears that
the courts have at least tentatively accepted the proposition that auditors can be liable under the securities acts for damages suffered by
third-party users of financial statements. 6 Moreover, the reported
decisions applied the normal liability standard of the applicable section
of the securities laws. Under some sections this means a negligence
standard, similar to that for malpractice in other professions, 7 but for
other sections the statutory standard is the fairness of disclosure, with
liability arising from material misleading statements or omissions' s in
the financial statements. 9

law negligence theories on the basis of alleged misstatements of sales and improper
application of the pooling of interests technique. Other major actions have recently been
at least tentatively settled, such as the Mill Factors action, a suit brought charging
errors in computation of that firm's 1968 income, which has been tentatively settled
for nearly $6 million, with the auditors paying the lion's share. See Wall Street J.,
September 24, 1970, at 8, col. 3.
Excellent summaries of the first four cases can be found in Reiling & Taussig, Recent
Liability Cases-Implications for Accountants, J. AccoUNTANcY, Sept. 1970, at 39.
14. The public accounting profession has erected an extensive procedure for the
creation, examination, reconsideration, alteration, and abandonment of accounting principles. See generally AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF CERTIFIED PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS [AICPAI,
ACCOUNTINo PRINCIPLES BOARD ACCOUNTING PRINCIPLES (1969)
[hereinafter cited as
APB ACCOUNTING PRINCIPLES]. Activity in this area has been prolific in recent years,
see

AMERICAN

INSTITUTE

OF

CERTIFIED

PUBLIC

ACCOUNTANTS,

ACCOUNTANT'S

INDEX

(1921), with its biennial supplements, and Index, J. ACCOUNTANCY, published semi-annually in the June and December issues, under "Accounting principles."
15. Examples of the suggested devices include practice as professional corporations
and changes in the auditor's report. See notes 50 and 51 and accompanying text, infra.
16. See note 13, supra.
17. Escott v. BarChris Constr. Corp., 283 F. Supp. 643 (S.D.N.Y. 1968). In evaluating the requisite standard of care to establish a due diligence defense under § 11 of the
Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1964), Judge McLean stated: "Accountants
should not be held to a standard higher than that recognized in their profession." 283
F Supp. at 703. The auditors were found liable in that case, but the court determined
that they had not completed all of the steps in their own audit program.
18. No liability attaches under the securities acts solely for a misleading statement;
the statement must be "material." It is not clear exactly what will be deemed a "material"
misstatement, however, and it appears that the standards will differ under different
sections of the securities acts. Nevertheless, even under Rule 10b-5, thought to be the
least restrictive of the securities acts devices, a misstatement, to be material, must directly
bear on the intrinsic value of the security, or at least be such that a reasonable man
would attach significance to it in evaluating a possible purchase or sale. See List v.
Fashion Park, Inc., 340 F.2d 457 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 811 (1965). Thus, not
ali of the misleading implications of financial statements will be potential sources of
liability. If the subject matter or amount is important, however, it would seem that
the misstatements will satisfy the requirement of materiality.
19. In the district court decision in United States v. Simon, an action under the
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II. OBJECTIVES OF EXPANDED LIABILITY
The probable reason for the continued viability of the privity defense
in the area of accountants' liability, even after the enactment and subsequent judicial extension of the federal securities acts,20 was the
strength of the practical arguments supporting the Ultramares decision.2 1 In that decision, Judge Cardozo noted:'
If liability for negligence exists, a thoughtless slip or blunder,
the failure to detect a theft or forgery beneath the cover of deceptive entries, may expose accountants to a liability in an indeterminate amount for an indeterminate time to an indeterminate class.
The hazards of a business conducted on these terms are so extreme as to enkindle doubt whether a flaw may not exist in the
implication of a duty that exposes to these consequences.
For three decades these difficulties seemed to cool the fervor of
those who were dissatisfied with the rule, but recently commentators
have argued for an expanded auditors' liability in an attempt to improve disclosure to investors and to compensate investors injured by
misleading financial statements.23 Even if the economic desirability of

Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Judge Mansfield stated:
[Tihe Court adheres to its view . . . that the jury was entitled, in determining
whether or not a defendant knowingly concealed a material fact, to consider and
weigh proof as to generally accepted auditing standards and accounting principles
in effect at the time of their actions . . . but that proof of such standards and
principles is not conclusive on the issue of fraud.
Petitioner's Brief for Certiorari, Appendix B--Opinion of Mansfield, J., at 4b, United
States v. Simon, 425 F.2d 796 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1006 (1970). The
court of appeals decision in that case was to the same effect. Judge Friendly expressly
approved the trial court charge to the jury which stated that proof of compliance with
generally accepted standards was
evidence which may be very persuasive but not necessarily conclusive that he acted
in good faith, and that the facts as certified were not materially false or misleading.
United States v. Simon, 425 F.2d 796, 805-06 (2d Cir. 1969).
20. See, e.g., §§ 11 and 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77k, 77q(a)
(1964), and § 18(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78r(a) (1934),
which expressly authorize private rights of action. The implied private right of action
under § 10(b) of the latter Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1964), and its supporting Rule lOb-5,
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1970), was established as early as 1947, in Kardon v. National
Gypsum Co., 73 F. Supp. 798 (E.D. Pa. 1947).
21. See, e.g., Katsoris, supra note 1, at 196. It should be noted that Judge Cardozo,
who wrote the decision in Ultramares establishing the privity defense for auditors, had
previously authored the opinion in MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 111
N.E. 1050 (1916), which first rejected the privity defense as applied to manufacturers.
22. Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, Niven & Co., 255 N.Y. 170, 179-80, 174 N.E. 441, 444
(1931).
23. See notes 3 & 4 and accompanying text, supra.
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these objectives could be shown,24 the following analysis suggests that
those commentators may have been too quick to reject Cardozo's
reasoning, and that expanded liability will probably not achieve either
of its stated ends.
A. Compensation of Injured Investors
1. Scope of the Liability
The potential liability of the auditors is as immense today as it was
when the Ultramares decision was written; for example, one of the
"big eight" public accounting firms25 recently reached tentative settlement of a liability suit for $4,950,000.20 Even this settlement amount

24. The argument for improved disclosure presupposes that the marginal value of
additional disclosure is greater than that of the assets sacrificed to pay its costs. Some
economists, however, suggest that investors are not using the disclosure they now have,
Bentson, The Effectiveness and Effects of the SEC's Accounting Disclosure Requirements,
in Manne, supra note 9, at 23. Other economists, while not questioning the use of
information per se, conclude that any available information is almost immediately discounted by the securities markets, so that at least disclosure which is made after some
persons are aware of its contents, "stale" disclosure, is of no value. Meltzer, On Efficiency
and Regulation of the Securities Industry, in Manne at 217; Rooney, Discussion and
Comments on Papers, in Manne at 106; See generally H. DAx, INSmR TRADING AND
THE STOCK MARKET (1966). Since the release of audited financial statements is often
delayed for months, the financial statements represent such "stale" disclosure, and under
either of the above analyses the utility and hence the marginal value of the improvement
in the statements would be relatively low. Some economists reject the above analysis, and
suggest that the value of new information is discounted over an extended period of time,
W.

BAUmOL, THE STOCK MARKET AND ECONOMIC

EFFICIENCY 44-46

(1965).

However,

even under this analysis, it appears that the imposition of stricter requirements upon the
auditor would simply cause a greater delay before issuance of the financial statements,
thereby reducing whatever informational value those statements might otherwise retain.
For a listing of additional possible detriments to investors from a policy of increased
disclosure, see Bentson, supra, at 25.
The goal of restitution of stock market losses might also be questioned. Investors are
presumed to recognize that there are certain risks inherent in securities transactions, and
they are presumed to have been adequately compensated for those risks by higher
returns. See generally Lintner, A Model of a Perfectly Functioning Securities Market, in
Manne, supra, at 143. It may be that the investors are the most appropriate parties to
bear that risk, simply because they can exact this compensation.
There are, of course, arguments favoring both objectives. See, e.g., Friend, The SEC
and the Economic Performance of Securities Markets, in Manne at 185; H. ROSE, DiscLOSURE IN COmPANY ACCOUNTS (2d ed. 1965). The requisite economic data has apparently
not yet been accumulated for a final evaluation, Introduction in Manne at vii, but it
appears today that the legal analysts are more certain of the merits of their objectives
than are the economists.
25. The so-called "big eight" public accounting firms perform the audits for about
80% of the publicly held companies in the United States. Louis, The Accountants Are
Changing the Rules, FORTUNE, June 15, 1968, at 177, 178. These firms are: Peat, Marwick,
Mitchell & Co.; Arthur Andersen & Co.; Ernst & Ernst; Price Waterhouse & Co.;
Haskins & Sells; Lybrand, Ross Bros. & Montgomery; Touche, Ross, Bailey & Smart
[now Touche, Ross & Co.]; and Arthur Young & Co.
26. Wall Street J., September 24, 1970, at 8, col. 3. An additional $1 million will be
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is small, however, compared to possible future actions based upon a
stock market where major stocks can decline 97% in value over a
two-year period,27 and a single man's holdings can be reduced in value
by $444 million in two days.2
Further, the auditors have become no wealthier, and as' service
businesses whose primary assets are adding machines, personnel, and
goodwill, the auditing firms can hardly be expected to pay judgments
of any size from their bank accounts.29 It does not appear, however,
that Ultramares has been forgotten; 30 instead, the commentators and
plaintiffs' attorneys believe that insurance is the answer to Cardozo's
dilemma.

paid by the officers and directors of Mill Factors under the terms of that settlement. In
November, 1967, Lybrand settled the civil suit arising out of the Continental Vending
Company audits for $1,960,936. Reiling & Taussig, supra note 13, at 49. Both of these
settlement amounts were substantially higher than any judgments in any other malpractice area to date; the largest medical malpractice judgment to date is only $1.5
million. Averbach, Rx for Malpractice, 1970 INs. L.J. 69 (1970).
27. Babson, The Stock Market's Collapse and Constructive Aftermath, The Commercial
& Financial Chronicle, June 4, 1970, at 4, 5.
28. The market value of H. Ross Perot's 81% holdings of Electronic Data Systems
Corp. decreased over $400 million during the April 22 and 23rd trading sessions. Seattle
Post-Intelligencer, April 24, 1970, at A, col. 5. As one practitioner has noted, "The facts
of life are that if you have a $50 million registration statement, the limit of the liability

for the CPA is $50 million, the gross offering price." CoRwoRAm FiNArcAl. REPORTNG,
CozrnpIc s Awn CHoENGEs 74 (J. Burton ed. 1969). (Burton reproduces the presenta-

tions and comments of a symposium conducted in November, 1968, by the AICPA, the
Financial Analysts Federation, the Financial Executives Institute and the Robert Morris
Associates, the national association of bank loan officers and credit men.)
29. Not all of the commentators agree with this position. Professor Edwin J. Bradley
adopted the position that "in the light of the economic maturation of the independent
accounting profession, further dependence on . . . judicial solicitude seems iln-advised."
Bradley, supra note 1, at 921. Bradley also noted that five years earlier Fortune had
estimated that the "big eight," while employing only 15% of the nation's CPA's, grossed
over $200 million. See also Wise, The Auditors Have Arrived, pt. I, FORTUNE, Nov. 1960,
at 151.
Bradley's argument that the profession is hardly an economic pauper is certainly true,
and more recent articles have indicated that the growth hasn't stopped. In 1966, it was
estimated that the gross revenues of the "big eight" had increased by 250% over their
1960 levels. Louis, The Accountants Are Changing the Rules, FORTUNE, June 15, 1968, at
178. A 1970 editorial in that magazine indicated that public accounting revenues have
reached $2 billion per year. Editorial, FoRTUNz, Aug. 29, 1970, at 98. Nevertheless, public
accounting does not generate the amount of income necessary to pay judgments of the
scope that Bradley or the other commentators are considering, and as another commentator
has pointed out, "it is not socially desirable to have reputable accounting firms ruined
financially because of one negligent audit." 41 ST. JoHN's L. REv. 588, 597 (1967).
30. Quoting from an editorial in the Journalof Accountancy, one analyst acknowledged
that "accounting firms are at a peculiar disadvantage in that the number of people who
might rely on an auditor's opinion, and the amount involved, are virtually unlimited.
This is not generally true of other professions." 41 ST. Join's L. Rv. 588, 597 (1967).
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2. Insurance
Some commentators were suggesting insurance as the panacea to

the threat of large judgments against accountants as early as 1951,"'
and the more recent analysts seem uniformly satisfied that this really
is a satisfactory answer.3 2 Unfortunately, accountant's liability insurance is not as complete an answer as the commentators have envisioned.
(a) Extent of Insurance Coverage
Normally, errors and omissions insurance provides no insurance
against loss on account of any dishonest, fraudulent or criminal act 3 3
The exact meaning of "fraudulent" in the context of statements prepared in conjunction with securities transactions is not completely
clear,34 but it seems almost certain that some element of affirmative
dishonesty or actual intent to deceive would be required to bring the
exception into play. 5 Even with the restriction upon insurance coverage so limited, however, the civil plaintiffs in the most serious cases,
where criminal as well as civil action would be appropriate, will be
denied any effective recovery.3 6
31. 36 IowA L. REv. 319, 327-28 (1951).
32. See, e.g., Solomon, supra note 1, at 86-89; 41 ST. JoHN's L. Rav. 588, 597 (1967).
33. R. RIEGEL & J. MI LER, INSURANCE PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICES 709 (5th Ed. 1966).
In discussing the accountants' liability policy, the authors state that "[n]o insurance is
provided, however, against loss on account of any dishonest, fraudulent, or criminal act."

See also Parish, Professional Liability Insurance, in

PROPERTY AND LIABILITY INSURANCE

HADBoox 478, 488 (D. Gregg & J. Long eds. 1965).

34. For example, despite the express use of the terms "fraud" and "defraud" in Rule
10b-5 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 17 CFR § 240.10b-5 (1970), even as basic
a requirement of actual fraud as intent, O'Connor v. Ludlam, 92 F.2d 50 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 302 U.S. 758 (1937), is being treated as non-essential for an action under that
Rule. See Stevens v. Vowell, 343 F.2d 374 (10th Cir. 1965). See generally Note, Scienter
and Rule 10b-5, 69 CoLUM. L. REv. 1057 (1969).
Moreover, some states appear to have adopted the federal securities acts' concept of
"fraud" in interpreting their own securities acts. See, e.g., Shermer v. Baker, 2 Wn. App.
845, 472 P.2d 589 (1970). A judge in such a jurisdiction might have difficulty framing an
opinion which simultaneously found "fraud" for purposes of establishing an auditor's
liability and rejected "fraud" for purposes of establishing the insurer's liability.
35. This is the case with the policies designed for corporate management in the same
situations. 63 Nw. U.L. REv., supra note 5, at 544 n.4 (1968), and the sales brochures
prepared by the present administrators of the AICPA-negotiated coverage, see note 43,
infra, state that they "provide coverage ... where claims for damages are based on: . . .
dishonesty, misrepresentation or fraud, except if made or committed . . . with affirmative
dishonesty or actual intent to deceive or defraud." Sales Brochure from Washington
Society of Certified Public Accountants to Joseph P. Dawson, February, 1971, on file at
Washington Law Review.
36. The auditors are aware of this weakness in their insurance coverage. In the civil
suit arising out of the Continental Vending Company audits, for example, the auditors
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(b) Price and Availbility of Insurance Coverage
Even the limited compensation to injured investors currently avail-

able from auditors' liability insurance will probably be short-lived if
that liability is significantly expanded. In 1966, the Wall Street Journal noted that auditors' malpractice insurance rates had recently risen

by 30% or more, and that many companies were refusing to write
these policies. More specifically, the article stated: 7
[0] f 15 insurers that wrote such coverage relatively freely a year
ago, six now handle it only as an "accomodation" for big accounts
or "in a limited manner," according to a recent issue of one insur-ance trade journal. Insurance Company of North America, Philadelphia, now has only one such policy in force in its New York
office compared with about 100 five years ago. Many insurers
have raised their rates by a third in order to make coverage pro-

fitable.
Five days later, the New York Times noted that Lloyd's of London,
which insures many of the leading companies in the accounting field,
had also raised its rates and that various members of the AICPA's Accounting Principles Board had projected that increased liability

would raise fees to a prohibitive level for audits 8 Within a short
while other writers were reporting that even the continued existence
of errors and omissions policies for auditors was in doubt 9
agreed to a settlement, even though the securities acts require actual damages, see, e.g.,
Securities Act of 1933 §§ 11(e) and 12, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77k, 771 (1964), and Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 18(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78r (1964), and the financial statement's certifica-1
tion was withdrawn before any actual damages occurred. Isbell, The Continental Vending
Case: Lessons for the Profession, J. AccouNTANcy, Aug. 1970, at 33.
It should also be noted that there are strong policy arguments against extending insurance coverage to criminal actions. Note, Public Policy and Directors' Liability Insurance,
67 CoLum. L. Rnv. 716 (1967), and that some would extend the prohibition to any
liability arising under the Securities Acts, Comment, 63 Nw. U.L. REv. supra note 5, at
555.
37. Wall Street J., Nov. 15, 1966, at 1, col. 6.
38. N.Y. Times, Nov. 20, 1966, Sec. 3, at 1, col. 1. While it might be questionable to
accept the opinion of partisans without further question, it appears that there is something to the accountants' fears. A commentator discussing insurance for directors and
officers of corporations against the same risks facing the auditors suggested that the cost
of such insurance was so high as to be burdensome even to some of the largest corporations. Anderson, Directors and Officers Liability Insurance, 47 Cmr. B. REC. 31 (1965).
If anything, the scope of the risks is greater today, and even the largest auditing firms
are not in the same league as the largest corporations, even though they bear the same
risks.
39. Even the largest accounting firms, some of which carry liability insurance over $10
million, were not sure that they would continue to be eligible by 1968. Louis, The Accountants Are Changing the Rules, FoRTuNE, June 19, 1968, at 177. This was in a period of
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Advocates of increased liability acknowledged these difficulties, but,
in their view, there was little danger of insurance costs becoming
absolutely prohibitive. 40 They argued that since all public accounting
firms would be obligated to pay the insurance rates, the increased expense could be spread over the entire business community by an
increase in the standard auditing fee. 4 Any suggestion that such an
increase might be more than the traffic could bear, or that the policies
might not be available at any price,2 was apparently rejected.4"
It may be too early to tell with absolute certainty which analysts
were correct in their prognostications, 4 but it is not difficult to deter-

unprecedented prosperity. The current situation, which has induced predictions of bankruptcies of major companies by knowledgable senior executives, Wall Street J., July 3,
1970, at 16, col. 1, and has already seen one major company, the Pennsylvania Central
Railroad, go under, presents a much bleaker picture. For additional commentary on the
Penn Central case and its repercussions affecting the accounting profession, see Loving,
The Penn Central Bankruptcy Express, FORTUNE, Aug. 1970, at 104; Wall Street J.,
Aug. 10, 1970, at 5, col. 1; Letter from Walter E. Hanson, managing Partner of Peat,
Marwick, Mitchell & Co., to Louis Banks, Managing Editor of Fortune, Aug. 6, 1970,
reproduced in FORTUNE, Sept. 1970, at 87-88, with the Fortune editorial reply.
40. See, e.g., Katsoris, supra note 1, at 232; Note, 22 RUTGERS L. Rxv., supra note 1,
at 588; 41 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 588, 597-98 (1967).
41. See, e.g., 41 ST. JoHiN's L. Rxv. at 598.
42. One comment suggested that the current data was inconclusive, and
Any existing reluctance to issue such auditors' liability insurance is likely caused
by the presently unsettled legal situation, which makes it difficult for insurers to
establish a rate structure which will predictably maintain a favorable loss ratio.
Comment, 44 WASH. L. REv., supra note 1, at 181 n.228. This commentator is undoubtedly
correct, but he might be somewhat optimistic in believing that thi difficulties will disappear
during the forseeable future. Even if the legal situation were to stabilize, the accumulation of data upon which to base a rate structure, with the magnitude of potential judgments considered, could be an expensive interlude for insurers.
43. Why the senior partners of major public accounting firms and other members of
the Accounting Principles Board who expressed worries as to the cost and availability
of insurance should be thought unaware of the available alternatives is unclear. One commentator, for example, suggested the employment of risk-pooling techniques, such as
experience-rated group policies. Comment, 44 WASH. L. REv., supra note 1, at 181 n.228.
This device, as far as possible, has been in use by accounting firms since at least the early
1940's, Benson, Member's Insurance, Fulfillment of a Need. CALioFRNA CPA Q., June,
1964, at 22, but in some states it is prohibited. For example, WASH. REv. CODE chs. 48.21,
24 (1969), which permit certain forms of group insurance in Washington, are deemed
exclusive; no other forms of group insurance are permitted in Washington. Interview
with Russell A. Davis, Executive Director of the Washington Society of Certified Public
Accountants, in Seattle, Washington, June 24, 1970.
As a practical matter, there has proved to be no magic in numbers for the auditors,
despite the theories. A negotiated policy endorsed by the state societies of over 20 states
was summarily terminated just over three years ago, although the liability insurance of
essentially all of the public accounting firms of over 20 states is a substantial block of
insurance. Davis interview, supra. Although the AICPA was eventually able to negotiate
a replacement policy, it does not appear overly secure, since the original administrators
of that program have already been replaced. THE CPA, July-Aug. 1970, at 9.
44. Part of the difficulty in this area arises from the fact that, while data on the
rates, self-insurance amounts, and coverage offered to smaller accounting firms is generally
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article by a partner in the Execumine the present trend. A July, 1970 45
tive Office of Haskins & Sells noted:
In some instances premium costs have tripled over the past
several years, while self-insurance, or the deductible portion
under the policies, has grown over 50 times.
The 1971 figures reflect a continuation of these geometric trends 40
Moreover, a May, 1970 article noted that the number of major casualty insurers in the United States still writing professional liability
insurance for public accountants was down to two. 47 It seems, therefore, that despite overwhelming increases in premium and deductible
amounts, insurers are abandoning the market.48
Consequently, while errors and omissions insurance provides a "deep
pocket" for the payment of some judgments today, insurance is not
as complete an answer as previous analysts assumed, and the present
trends indicate that even the current limited coverage may not remain
available much longer. It is likely that auditors will not be able to
satisfy judgments in favor of third parties for any appreciable length
of time.
B. Improvement of Disclosure
The legal commentators who advocated an expanded liability of
auditors to users of financial statements assumed that the threat of
liability would force the auditors to eliminate misleading financial disclosures. 49 Those writers were probably correct at least in assuming
available to members of the sponsoring professional societies, see sales Brochure, supra
note 35, information on the individually-negotiated policies of the larger accounting
firms is not readily available.
45. Weyrich, Exposure to Professional Liability, 1970 NEw YoRK CERTIED PuBnc

AccouAzN 556, 561 (July, 1970).

46. One analyst states that insurance premiums for 1971 have again tripled over
the 1970 levels for some firms among the top twenty in size, and that deductible amounts
have increased as much as 900% between the two years. Interview with W. Thomas
Porter, Associate Professor of Accounting and Director of Executive Development
Programs at the University of Washington, in Seattle, Washington, Nov. 26, 1970.
47. Bakay, A Review of Selected Claims Against CPA's, J. AccoUxTANcY, May 1970,
at 54. See note 37 and accompanying text, supra.
48. See Weyrich, supra note 45, at 561, where the author asserts:
This enormous insurance cost, despite the increasing amount of self-insurance
risk being assumed by the accountants, dearly reflects the insurance underwriters'
evaluation of the problem. Moreover, it is becoming apparent that insurance underwriters are losing interest in this type of coverage-at any price.
49. See, e.g., Note, 22 RuTGERS L. Rav., supra note 1, at 588; Comment, 44 WAsH. L.
REv., supra note 1, at 177.
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that there would be no alternative means open to the auditors for
avoiding the liability; such devices as practice in corporate form"0
and changes in the auditors' opinion 5 apparently will be ineffective

50. In December, 1969, AICPA members approved an amendment to the Code of
Professional Ethics to permit practice in incorporated form. J. ACCONTANCY, Feb. 1970,
at 7. Although an article dealing with the legal profession indicated that professional
incorporation had been legalized in 49 states as of mid-1970, Wall Street J., July 29, 1970,
at 1, col. 5, it appears that despite what some auditors believe, see, e.g., CORPORATE
FINANCIAL REPORTING: CONFLICTS AND CHALLENGES 74 (J. Burton ed. 1969), professional
corporation status will not normally shield auditors from complete liability for losses due
to negligent or wrongful acts or misconduct in the performance of professional services.
45 WASH. L. REv. 827, 830 (1969). Incorporation is not a malpractice buffer under the
usual state statute. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE § 18.100.070 (Supp. 1970).
It is arguable that the California professional corporation laws, CAL. Bus. & PROF.
CODE §§ 5157, 13400-10 (West 1962), permit limited malpractice liability for professional
corporations which maintain adequate malpractice insurance coverage. Even if the argument were accepted, however, it would be of little solace to auditors, since it is the
potential unavailability of such insurance which prompts the search for alternatives. For
a discussion of the possible application of the California statute to the public accounting
profession, written prior to the adoption of CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 5157, see Neider
& Tims, CPA Incorporation-Why Not?, 10 SANTA CLARA LAwYFR 64 (1969).
51. See, e.g., Editorial, The Specter of Auditors' Liability, J. ACCOUNTANCY, Sept. 1965,
at 33. This proposal suffers from numerous practical problems. There are technical
objections to the general-purpose use of a longer, "clearer" opinion, such as the possibility
that exceptions taken by the auditors will tend to be buried, rather than spotlighted. See
H. STETTLER, AUDITING PRINCIPLES 622-29 (2d ed. 1961). There are substantial pressures
from users of financial statements, (Accountant's Legal Liability, J. ACCOUNTANCY, July
1968, at 58. (excerpts from an address by Walter J. Coakley of Sullivan & Cromwell
before the Ohio Society of CPA's in Cleveland, Ohio, Oct. 19, 1967) ; see generally
CORPORATE FINANCIAL REPORTING: CONFLICTS AND CHALLENGES (J. Burton ed. (1969))
and from auditors themselves, (See, e.g., Wyatt, supra note 1, at 357 (1968)) against
any changes which appear to reduce the extent of the auditor's responsibility. Recent SEC pronouncements, such as Accounting Series Release No. 90, March 1, 1962,
and Accounting Series Release No. 115, Feb. 19, 1970, suggest that attempts to hedge
through rewording of the opinion will bring the auditors into violation of SEC Reg.
S-X, 17 C.F.R. § 210 (1971), even though the requirements of that resolution are not
expressly exclusive, with all of the resulting calamitous effects for both auditor and client.
See note 127, infra.
More importantly, it is unlikely that changes in the opinion, short of an express disclaimer of the specific liability in question, would be legally effective to shield the auditors
from liability. The opinion currently used by auditors already makes it clear that there
is no attempt to guarantee the accuracy of statements, COMmiTTEE ON AUDITING PROCEDURE, AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF CERTIFIED PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS [AICPA], AuDrrNo
STANDARDS AND PROCEDURES 57 (Statements on Auditing Procedures No. 33, 1963) [hereinafter cited as S.A.P. No. 33], but this has been ineffective in preventing users of financial
statements from developing the impression of "an accountant's report as something like
an insurance policy," Accountants' Legal Liability, supra, at 58, or in preventing liability
in the recent cases, see note 13 and accompanying text, supra. The suggestion that nothing
short of an express disclaimer will be effective arises from the very close analogy between
the auditor's position and that of manufacturers, and the judicial trend toward requiring such express disclaimers, see, e.g., Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J.
358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960), if in fact any disclaimer at all is to be effective. See Ulmer v.
Ford Motor Co., 75 Wn. 2d 522, 452 P.2d 729 (1969), for a case adopting the notion of
strict liability of manufacturers which effectively allows no disclaimer in some situations.
Although the courts will probably be satisfied with nothing less than express disclaimers,
however, there are strong doubts that such disclaimers could be given effect if they were
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to shield the auditors from the expanded liability. Unfortunately, the
commentators seem to have seriously underestimated some of the
roadblocks to the improvement of disclosure.
Communication Difficulties
The auditor's communication of the status of a business entity is
limited to the financial statements, with their footnotes, and his opinion
on them. It is extremely difficult, however, to communicate the status
of a business entity and the results of its operations over a period of
time through financial statements and footnotes. At least two major
factors contribute to this difficulty, and it may be that both are insurmountable.
First, the language and symbolism employed in financial statements
is different and more complex than the language employed in everyday
communication. There are numerous terms of art which carry meanings2
different from those normally attached to the same terms by laymen,
and sometimes even different from the normally envisioned technical
meanings of the words.5 3 Like other technical languages, it is a type
1.

used. The auditors' expanded liability is based upon a statutory standard, see notes 16-19
and accompanying text, supra, and it may be that there is no effective way to disclaim a

liability which arises out of violation of the federal securities acts. See James, Statutory

Standards and Negligence in Accident Cases, 11 LA. L.R. 95 (1950); see also Gregory,

Breach of Criminal Licensing Statutes in Civil Litigation, 36 ComaRNr L.Q. 622 (1951).
The federal securities acts are essentially criminal regulatory acts. See Securities Act of
1933 § 24, 15 U.S.C. § 77x (1964), Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 32, 15 U.S.C. §78ff
(1964). The express terms of § 14 of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77n (1§64)

and § 29(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78cc(a) (1964), making
"any condition, stipulation, or provision binding any person to waive compliance with
any provision of the acts themselves or any rules or regulations thereunder" void, coupled
with the attitude of the SEC towards even attempts at indemnification agreements
reflected in Note to Rule 460 of the Securities Act of 1933, 17 C.F.R. § 230.460 (1971),
indicate that the legislative intent to allow a defense through express disclaimers of
liability could not be found by the courts.
In any event, there is no question as to the SEC's position on express disclaimers by
auditors. SEC Accounting Series Release No. 7 (1938) lists a "disclaimer of responsibility
on the part of the certifying accountants with respect to matters clearly within their
province" among deficiencies encountered in filed financial statements, and deficiencies
mean ineffective reports and registration statements. See note 127, infra. A disclaimer
will guarantee a client financial calamity.
52. An example is the term "credit." See note 122 and accompanying text, infra, for
a discussion utilizing a common interpretation of the term "credit." Whatever that term
connotes to readers, it is almost certainly not the amounts representing the liabilities and
equity of a business enterprise, which is the meaning of the term in the context of
financial statements. As an additional sidelight, it is probably fair to predict that no one
other than those trained in preparing financial statements, and perhaps not all of them,
would equate the term "deferred credit" with received-but-unearned revenue.
53. An example is the term "reserve." While the normal connotation of the term is an
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of shorthand, employing single terms to represent entire concepts
which are clear to the preparer of the statements but vague to the
users.

54

Like all technical languages or vocabularies, the language of accountants has come under harsh fire at times, 5 both from within and
without the accounting profession. 6 The normal rebuttal to attacks
on technical languages is that the terminology expedites activity among
those familiar with the language, as is the case, for example, with
medical jargon. That rebuttal is valid only when those who are unfamiliar with the language have no need to understand the attempted
communications. Since the statements are intended for use and understanding by the general populace, 7 the convenience of preparers and
auditors is not a sufficient answer.
Unlike a general statement which can ordinarily be made in clear,
simple terms, however, a specific financial statement, covering every
technicality and carrying exactly the specific message intended, can
more often than not be made only in technical terms, carrying explicit
accumulation held for some specific purpose, the technical usage of that phrase until
recently denoted simply an amount treated as an expense and representing a decrease in
value of an asset account or an estimated liability. In the case of the "reserve for depredation," for example, the term was intended to denote a systematic reduction in
value to apportion the cost of an asset, but not to indicate the accumulation of an
equivalent amount for replacement of the asset. The inherent confusion in this usage
became obvious to preparers of financial statements, and modem statements replace this
term with other terms, such as "allowance for depreciation" or "accumulated depreciation." See W. MEiGs, C. JoHNsoN & T. KELLm, INTEEmDiATE ACCOUNTMnG 130 (1963).
Elimination of the problems inherent in a technical language is apparently not a
simple task.
54. See generally AMERICAN INSTITUTE Or CERTiED PuB c AccoUNTANTS [AICPA],

AccouNTrseG TEmmoLoGy BuLLET s Nos. 1-4, in 2 A.P.B. ACCOUNTING PRICIPLES,
supra note 14, at ff 9501.
55. This criticism seems justified. See Lehnberry, THE U.S. ARmn AvnIT AoErNcy
BULL., Dec. 1963, at 34-40; Garbutt, Students' Understanding of Accountancy Terms, AccOUNTANCY, Mar. 1964, at 203-08. In fact, even the Wall Street Journal has difficulty
deciphering some financial statements. Stabler, The Conglomerates: Even the Accountants
Find Some Financial Reports of Combines Baffling, Wall Street J., Aug. 5, 1968, at 1,
col. 6.
56. A former Commissioner of the SEC stated, "I simply mean to suggest that a lay
reader can read perfectly dear English and an orderly presentation of financial data and
end up without a comprehension of the message sought to be conveyed." Address by
Jack M. Whitney II before the Washington, D.C. Society of Investment Analysts, Feb. 5,
1963, quoted in J.ACCOUNTANCY, March 1963, at 9. See also Watson, Do Financial Statements Communicate? J. AccoUNTANcy, April 1969, at 59; AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF
CERTIED PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS, ACcOUNTrG TERMmOLOGY BULLETiNs, Introduction,
in 2 A.P.B. AcCOUNTING PRncnLsS, supra note 14, at 1 9504.
57. See H. STETTLER, AUDITING PRnNcLEs 627 (2d ed. 1961) for a discussion of the
use of technical jargon by accountants. See also M. CHARLEY, REPoRT NG 181 (1959),
for comments on the use of technical jargon in an analogous field, newswriting.
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denotations. Legislative and other legal drafters find themselves confronted by this dilemma which often results in "incomprehensible"
legal documents and legislation; s preparers of financial information
and their auditors face the same problem. No one yet has proposed a
real solution to this problem,r9 and so long as it remains it will be a
barrier to full disclosure.
The second major difficulty in communicating through financial
statements and footnotes comes from the necessity for summarization. 60 In part, this problem is an extension of the difficulties inherent
in the use of accounting language; the use of any language indicates a
summarization of the available information, 1 and the language of accounting is still further limited in that it makes no attempt to describe
all of the characteristics of a business entity or business events, but
instead attempts to communicate only the monetary magnitude of
business events.' Even beyond the limitations inherent in the language, however, is the absolute limit upon the data which can be
communicated in the statements themselves; they must be relatively
short to be useable at all. Financial statements and their footnotes

58. See generally D. MELxINEor, TnE LAEUAGE or TE LAw (1963).

59. Some commentators have suggested that the solution to the difficulties in communicating through accounting language, if a solution exists, will be achieved by narrow-

ing still further the denotations of the technical terms. In effect, they are arguing that
the language is not technical enough. See, e.g., Garbutt, Problems in Accounting Terminology, TE COST AccouNTANT, April 1964, at 119-24; Watson, Do FinancialStatements
Communicate? J. AccouNTANcm, April 1969, at 59.
There may be some vadidity to the suggested proposals; the language may not be, in
fact, as technical as the most sophisticated users would like. Narrowing the definition of
terms and creating a still more technical language, however, would do little to help the
average users of financial statements; their only apparent benefit from such a proposal
would hinge upon a massive program of education of users in the technical language,
and such a program is beyond the unilateral capability of the public accounting profession, if it is feasible at all.
The auditors are caught in the middle; making the language more technical will only
compound the problems of most users, but using a less technical language will cripple
their ability to communicate with any accuracy through the medium of financial statements. But see Address by Jack M. Whitney H before the Washington D.C. Society of
Investment Analysts, Feb. 5, 1963, quoted in J. AccouNTANcy, March 1966, at 9.
60. Some of the difficulties in selecting and phrasing material for disclosure, under
today's interpretations of Rule 10b-6, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1971), are considered in
Judge Moore's dissent to SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968).
The dilemma which Judge Moore saw that decision as placing upon management is in
many respects repeated in the preparation of financial statements.
61. See, e.g., D. Bmaaxo, TEE Paocass or COM'rUNIcALoN 26 (1960); S. CHASE,
PowER or WoRDs 139-40 (1953).
62. Li, Semantics of Communication Theory and Accountancy, J. Accouxmun RESEcH, Spring, 1963, at 102.
IssiON, DISCLOSURE To hnTSoRs-,A RE63. SEcuRITIs AND ExCHAnGE Co
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necessarily only summarize the relevant data, and it seems impossible
that such a summary, or any of the data within it, could be other than
misleading to some degreeY 4
2. Control of Financial Statement Content
Even if "improvements" in the quality of audits and reports provided some protection against the expanding liability of auditors,
utilization of that protection would require that the contents of financial
statements be under the auditors' control. They are not; the finanical
statements are management's responsibility. 65 These statements are the
report of management on its stewardship of the financial entity, and
management has made it clear that they desire greater latitude, not
less latitude, in the preparation of these reports. 6
Arguments have been advanced that management's performance in
this area renders it, by and large, unfit to continue to perform the func6
tion of reporting.6 7 Possibly there is some justification for this view, 8
but there are equally strong arguments for management's position.
Management is the only one who can prepare financial statements. A
report on financial position and operations requires the development
and operation of a system within the organization to accumulate and
organize the information for the report. Only management can develop
and operate this system; certainly an auditor could not do so and remain independent.69 In addition, the summary form is obviously neces-

APPRAISAL

or

ADMINISTRATIVE

POLICIES UNDER

THE

'33

AND

'34

ACTs

(THE

WHEAT

REPORT) 41-43 (1969).
64. See note 18, supra.
65. This includes the footnotes to the financial statements. Bullock, Footnotes in Financial Statement Preparation,J. ACCOUNTANCY, July 1956, at 39.
66. See generally CORPORATE FINANCIAL REPORTING: CONFLICTS AND CHALLENGES
(J.Burton ed. 1969).
67. See, e.g., Kripke, Conglomerates and the Moment of Truth in Accounting, CONGLOMERATE MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS: OPINION & ANALYSIS, 44 ST. JOHN'S L. Rav. 791
(Special Ed. 1970); Loving and other authorities cited in note 39, supra.
68. Without exception, the cases where auditors have been made parties to suits

alleging misstatements in the financial statements (see note 9, supra) present situations

where management's performance of its stewardship and reporting functions have appeared inadequate, and these cases hardly represent an exhaustive listing of that phenomenon.
But see CORPORATE FINANCIAL REPORTING: CONFLICTS AND CHALLENGES 4 (J.
Burton
ed. 1969). The users, as well as the preparers, of financial statements agreed that there
was not as acute a problem with people taking advantage of differing principles in
preparing those statements as many outsiders believed.
69. See, e.g., Appendix to Address by Donald C. Cook, Vice-Chairman of the Securities
and Exchange Commission, before- the AICPA, -Oct; 3,- 1950,- reproduced at 4 CCH FED.
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sary for the report, and a report which is to be a summary requires
decisions on the inclusion or exclusion of information. Only management has the knowledge required to make those decisions. Moreover,
the SEC, which has the final word in the dispute, has made it clear that
70
it regards the statements as management's responsibility.

3. Suggested Solutions to the Disclosure Problems
Most analysts have argued that the difficulties outlined above can be
overcome by the application of "better accounting principles, 7 1 using
the phrase broadly to mean improved accounting principles and
improved auditing and reporting standards.72 Neither, however, appears to provide a practical solution to the problem of misleading
disclosure.
(a) Improved Accounting Principles
When accountants speak of generally accepted accounting principles,
they are speaking of the various acceptable assumptions, procedures,
and techniques73 for the preparation of financial statements.7 4 They
are speaking of the ways of stating financial data within the limitations
established to prevent reporters from accidentally or intentionally
straying too far in their portraits of a business entity. The position of
SEC. L. REP. II 68,515.41, .62-.64 (1970). Accountants who had set up and operated
accounting systems for clients were deemed not independent for purposes of audits under
the securities acts.
70. SEC Accounting Series Release No. 62 (1947) states:
Financial statements filed for the registrant and its subsidiaries have been recognized
by this Commission and by public accountants generally as representations of management upon whom rests the primary responsibility for their propriety and accuracy.
71. See, e.g., Bradley, supra note 1, at 898; Wyatt, supra note 1, at 331; 23 VANs.
L. REv. supra note 1, at 813-14.
In discussing the difficulties inherent in defining the term accounting principles, one
writer notes that there are at least twenty common words in use with the same meaning
as "principles"; the problem, of course, is that the connotations of each of these words
is significantly different. They may all mean "principles," but they are not synonyms.
McMonnies, The Importance of Being English, T=E AcCOUINTANT'S MACAZINE, Feb.
1967, at 74. See also AmERIcAN INsTuTE OF CERTIFIED PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS, AccOUNTING TERmINOLOGY BuLLrTIN No. 1, in 2 A.P.B. AccouNzaNG PRINCIPLES, supra
note 14 at ff 9505.
72. S.A.P. No. 33, supra note 51, at 15-17 states these standards.
73. For a comprehensive listing of alternative techniques included among generally
acceptable accounting principles, see P. GRADY, INVENTORY or GENERALLY ACCEPTED
ACCOUNTING PRINCIPLES FOR BusINEss ENTERPRISES 373-79 (Accounting Research Study
No. 7 1965).
74. SA.. No. 33, supra note 91, at 40.
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the commentators who actually attack "accounting principles" is normally that the range of these permissible alternatives, either as a
whole or within particular industries, should be narrowed.75
This approach is unlikely to contribute much to the elimination of
misleading statements in financial statements, however. Even if it
were possible to narrow the spectrum of generally accepted accounting
principles, the solution may be self-defeating. Every business entity
reflects a different economic reality, and the imposition of narrower
limits upon financial reporters in a search for a less misleading
financial statement is just as likely to produce a more misleading financial statement." Furthermore, there is no general agreement as to
which generally accepted accounting principles are undesirable. Since
both opponents and proponents of any given principle can present
factual patterns showing either the accuracy or complete misstatement
possible under that particular principle, they have made little progress.17
75. See, e.g., Bradley, supra note 1, at 898. Many accountants have also expressed
this position. See note 14, supra.
76.
vhile a narrowing of the range of alternative methods available for reflecting
economic reality may prevent extreme misstatements, it may also prevent extremely accurate statements. Carried anywhere near its logical extreme, the narrowing of generally
accepted accounting principles would so limit reporters that no financial statements
would properly reflect the status of the described entity. CoRPoRATE FiNANcms REPORTING: CONrLICTS AND CnALLENGES 4 (J. Burton ed. 1969). Surprisingly, the users as
well as preparers of financial statements who were involved in the symposium indicated
that they felt abuse in this area to be relatively infrequent.
77. One example is recorded in R. AMORY & C. HARDEE, MATImALs ON Accou=rnw
9-16 (1968 Supp. D. Herwitz). General Motors and Standard Oil of New Jersey each
sold their one-half interests in the Ethyl Corporation, with net profits totalling nearly
$130 million. GM included its share of the gain in 1962 net income, while Standard Oil of
New Jersey credited its gain directly to surplus. Since then, the Accounting Principles
Board has designed a system for reporting such gains which is intended to eliminate the
problem. See AccouNTniN, PRiNcILEs BOARD, AICPA, OPINION No. 9 (1966). Unfortunately, because both sides had logical arguments supporting their position, the APB was
able to do no more than say that both a figure including the gain and a figure excluding
the gain should be shown. That solution really does not solve the problem.
A more recent example is the debate over "pooling of interests" in merger cases.
Favoring the retention of "pooling" as an acceptable technique, see Lauver, The Case
for Poolings, 41 ACCOuNTiNG REv. 65 (1966); Schrader, Malcolm & Willingham, In Support of Poolings, FINANCIAL EXECUTIVE, Dec. 1969, at 54; Snavely, "Pooling" is Good
Accounting, FnANCIAL ANALYSTS J., Nov.-Dec. 1968, at 85. Opposing that principle see
Brillof, Distortions Arising from Pooling-of-Interests Accounting, FINANCIAL ANALYSTS J.,
March-April 1968, at 71; Gormley, The Pooling of Interests Principle of Accounting: A
Lawyer's View, 24 Bus. LAW. 407 (1968). With this background, it is hardly surprising
that when the Accounting Principles Board attacked the problem at the end of 1969
there was little prospect held out for major action; even the SEC was reported backing
off from the problem, Wall Street J., Dec. 3, 1969, at 40, col. 1. Perhaps it is amazing
that the Board took even the action that it did. See Wall Street J., Aug. 3, 1970, at 4,
col. 3; AcCOUNTINc PRINCIPLES BOARD, AICPA, OPINION No. 16 (1970).
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(b) Improved Auditing and Disclosure Standards
Some commentators have recognized the futility of attacking misleading disclosure by attacking accounting principles, recognizing that
it is not the principle itself, but the application of the principle to a
particular business entity, which determines whether the resulting
78
statement will be misleadingThese analysts argue that the problems of communication and
control can be overcome through the improvement of what the
accountants term "auditing standards,"70 including the standards of
disclosure. 80 The gist of this argument is a demand for auditing and
reporting techniques which will create more certainty from the audit,
more accuracy in the reported figures, and an explanation in the report
which will leave no material data uncommunicated.
Taken literally, this argument is circular; in effect, the analysts are
saying that the problems inherent in improving disclosure can be
solved by requiring better disclosure. All of the previously suggested
constraints work against the performance of the necessary work and
preparation of the desired statements sl The auditors maintain that
additional accuracy, certainty, and explanation are not possible within
the present scope of their audits.8 2 They maintain that they can't work
magic.

s3

78. See, e.g., Comment, 44 WASH. L. REv., supra note 1, at 146. This approach appears
to coincide with that of the SEC, or at least of one commissioner. Woodside, A Review
of the Commission's Administrative Policies Relating to Financial Reporting Under the
Securities Acts, J. AccoUNTANCY, Feb. 1966, at 49, 52.
79. See note 72, supra.
80. See, e.g., Comment, 44 WASH. L. REv., supra note 1, at 148-51, which argues for
improved disclosure standards.
81. See notes 52-70 and accompanying text, supra.
82. Of course, this is not literally true. Some techniques have been proposed, attempted, and apparently proved sound, but not uniformly adopted throughout the profession. One notable example is the use of statistical sampling and Bayesian probability
analysis in auditing. See, e.g., Aam cAN INs TuTE or CERT=DID PUBLIC ACcoUNTANTs,
AN AunrroR's APPROACH To STATIsTICAL SAoPLING (1967-1969); Tracy, Bayesian
Statistical Confidence Intervals for Auditors, J. AccouNTAwCY, July 1969, at 41; Trentin,
Sampling in Auditing-A Case Study, J. AccorTANcy, March 1968, at 39. One article
considering expanded auditor's liability suggested that universal use of these techniques
would contribute to the elimination of misleading statements, and that conclusion is
probably correct. Reiling & Taussig, supra note 13, at 39. It must be recognized, however,
that the use of statistical techniques is hardly a complete answer. Many of the accounts
analyzed in an audit do not readily lend themselves to statistical sampling, either because
the absolute value of each item is too great or because the total population is too small
to permit a meaningful and significant statistical sample to be drawn and analyzed.
Furthermore, confidence limits in Bayesian analysis include a factor which is arrived at
through educated guesses. Misleading statements, with their resulting liability, arise in

693

Washington Law Review

Vol. 46: 675, 1971

An alternative interpretation of the analysts' position avoids the necessity for prestidigitation, however. Greater accuracy, certainty, and
explanation could all be achieved by the relatively simple expedient of
drastically expanding the scope of the audit, and there are no theoretical barriers to doing more work. Probably this is the course which
previous commentators had in mind. Unfortunately, this approach
faces a practical problem. Although the accounting profession has
frequently indicated a desire to expand its attest function, 4 it can't
realistically do so. The public accounting profession has a manpower
shortage.
John L. Carey, the past AICPA Executive Director, has pointed
out:8 5
[C]ountless CPA's in large and small firms have said that their
greatest problem is getting enough qualified people to do the work
that needs to be done.
The 1969 president of the AICPA headed his list of problems facing
the profession that year with the increasing shortage of college graduates coming into the profession."'
The exact scope of the manpower shortage in public accounting has
never been made completely clear.87 The best estimates indicate, howsituations where those educated guesses were incorrect, and statistical techniques will
make those guesses no more accurate. See generally H. BIERMAN, C. BONINI, L. FOURAKER
& R. JAEDICKE, QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS FOR BUSINESS DECISIONS (Rev. Ed. 1965).
83. The accounting literature has continually pointed out that the auditing procedures
are limited tests of a system and its results, and that the scope of these tests is inadequate
to permit any conclusion beyond that of the fairness of the statements as a whole. See,
e.g., NATIONAL

CONFERENCE OF BANKERS AND CERTIFIED PUBLIC
AUDITOR'S REPORT-ITS MEANING AND SIGNIFICANCE (1967).

84.
at 51,
attest
85.
Street
86.

ACCOUNTANTS,

THE

See, e.g., Imke, The Future of the Attest Function, J. ACCOUNTANCY, April 1967,
where the author stated that 89% of the accountants surveyed believed that the
function should be expanded.
Carey, How to Attract Young People, CPA, March 1964, at 4. See also Wall
J., February 4, 1969, at 1, col. 5.
Kent, The Accounting Profession and Our Firm: Past, Present and Future, Tnz
ARTHUR YOUNG J., 75th Anniv. Ed., Spring-Summer 1969, 4, at 10. The significance of
the statement is heightened when it is noted that the "big eight" accounting firms, and
apparently most others in public accounting, are hiring only college graduates. N.Y.
Times, Nov. 20, 1966, at 14, col. 7. There is little question that the bare undergraduate
degree is the minimum educational requirement today, as the complexity and scope of
the economy and of the auditor's role within it has undergone tremendous expansion in
recent years. In fact, by mid-1968, 29 states had made a college degree a prerequisite
for the CPA certificate. J.ACCOUNTANCY, Aug. 1968, at 10.
87. One survey on the requirements for accountants in a current year is being performed currently by Mr. Leo Herbert of the U.S. General Accounting Office, and another
is planned this year by the AICPA. Letter from Maria J. Salvemini, Staff Assistant in
the Examinations Division of the AICPA, to Joseph P. Dawson, July 8, 1970.
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ever, that the demand"" for accounting-trained personnel in the public
accounting firms alone will equal approximately 80% of the total available supply89 of such people in any current year,"° that only about 60%
of the total number of accounting-trained people have the minimum
qualifications for the practice of public accounting, 9 and that, after
allowing for the competition of business and government for the
available people, the public accounting profession cannot anticipate
obtaining more than 50 percent of the available new personnel, 2 or,
88. One of the "big eight" public accounting firms projected a demand just among
public accounting firms across the country for 15,000 new people in 1969. Schornack,
The Arthur Young People, Tnz ARTHR Yomro J., 75th Anniv. Ed., Spring-Summer
1969, 64, at 69. Guy Trump's independent estimates were 14,000 in 1969, 15,000 in 1970,
and 20,000 in 1975. Letter from Guy W. Trump, Director of Education of the AICPA,
to Joseph P. Dawson, June 5, 1970 [hereinafter cited as Trump Letter].
89. In 1968, 18,075 undergraduate degrees in accounting were earned in the United
CENSUs, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT or THE UNITED STATES 131
States. U.S. BuREAu op I
(1970). While the equivalent figures in every preceeding year were over 2,000 lower,
and reflected no major increments, and while the AICPA Director of Education estimated
that there would be only 16,000 trained people available to meet the 1970 personnel requirements in accounting, Trump Letter, supra note 88, the higher, more conservative
figure of 18,000 is used in this analysis as the annual available supply.
90. This percentage is based upon an assumption of a supply of 18,000 people and a
demand among public accounting firms for 15,000 people annually. See notes 88-89,
supra.
91. Trump Letter, supra note 88. Mr. Trump indicated that of the 16,000 accountingtrained people available to meet the personnel requirements of accounting in 1970, only
10,000 might be reasonably well-qualified for the accounting profession. He qualified this
estimate, however, by noting that the evaluation of the qualifications of prospective
public accounting personnel is extremely difficult.
92. A 1961 survey of Drake University accounting graduates since 1921 found only
25 percent of those graduates working in public accounting. TnE AccouNTiNG Rav., Jan.
1961, at 121. A 1964 survey in Louisiana suggested that the accounting profession could
anticipate obtaining 60 percent of the available accounting-trained personnel. Tracker,
A Study of the Successful CPA Candidates in Louisiana, 5 Sittings, LA. CPA, May 1964,
as cited in Burnam, Obtaining and Keeping Personnel, LA. CPA, July 1964, at 32.
More recently Carpenter & Strawser, in Job Selection Preferences of Accounting Students, J. ACCOUNTANCY, June 1970, at 84, 85, arrived at the following table of Job
Preferences of undergraduate accounting majors by academic average:
Grade-Point
Average*

National
CPA Firms

Local
CPA Firms

9
26
49
35

5
19
32
28

4
7
17
7

119

84

35

Number of
Respondents

3.50 or above
3.00 to 3.49
2.50 to 2.99
Below 2.50
Totals
*(A-4.00; B-3.00; C-2.00)

The difficulty with the later figures, as pointed out by the preceeding table, is that
no correction has been made in recognition of the quality standards of the accounting
profession. Arbitrarily assuming a cut-off above the lowest level in the preceeding table
as an appropriate correction produces a figure of roughly 50 percent.
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in other words, hardly more than 60 percent of the new people required
simply to maintain today's level of services. 3 Moreover, there seems
no reason to anticipate any major shift in the number of accountants
entering public accounting in the near future. 4
The public accounting profession has been actively attempting to
alleviate its unique manpower and recruiting problems for several
years.95 The profession requires top-caliber practitioners, but is not
well-known9 6 and is an element of the business field, which is becoming

93. See note 88, supra. The percentages do not completely take into account the trend
in the public accounting profession toward hiring and training people with advanced
degrees. One of the "big eight" hired 40 percent of its new personnel in a recent year from
among graduate students, N.Y. Times, Nov. 20, 1966, at 14, col. 7, and a recent study
indicated that public accounting led the field in career choices of holders of M.B.A. degrees from the "Big Eight" graduate business schools, with 10.8 percent of those graduates
electing public accounting as their career choices. MBA ENTERPRISES, INc., MBA RECRUITMENT, Table 24 (1968), cited in Schornack, supra note 88, at 70-71. Unfortunately,
this trend is of little solace to those looking at the plight of auditing, as these people are
generally being employed in the management services departments of the accounting
firms, rather than in auditing. They do not provide, on the whole, a manpower pool
from which to draw auditors.
94. Professor Howard Stettler recently predicted that the increased use of the computer for clerical tasks by industry would result in nearly allaccountants being employed
in public accounting by the year 2000. CPAs/Auditing/2000-t, J. Accou-NTAscy, May
1968, at 55. Other prognosticators, on the other hand, predict an even greater industrial
demand for people with training in accounting and finance. J. AccomrANcY, June 1970,
at 24.
Perhaps the most efficient way in which to predict the probable trend in the need for
public accountants is an examination of the possible direction of the national economy
for, as Ralph Kent suggested, the growth of the public accounting profession, subject
only to the availability of the necessary personnel, can be expected at least to follow
the growth of the economy. Kent, The Accounting Profession and Our Firm: Past,
Present and Future, THE ARTHUR YOUNG J., 75th Anniv. Ed., Spring-Summer 1969,
at 9.

95. Numerous recruiting programs have been suggested, evaluated, and implemented
at all levels. A number of these are discussed in Attraction of Personnel to Public Accounting Firins, J. AccouNrANcY, June 1969, at 57. Numerous other programs have been
publicized in various professional publications. See, e.g., TITE WAsHN;GTON CPA, Nov.,
1970, at 3. See generally AMERICAN

INSTITUTE

OF ACCOUNTANTS,

ACCOUNTANT'S INDEX

(1921), and the ACCOUNTANT'S INDEX SUPPLEM Tx(s) through 1968. Reports of success
in these programs is less frequent, however. For discussion of one relatively successful
program at the post-graduate level, see Nw. U. Bus. REiP., Spring, 1969 at 26. As a
result, some of the most recent programs go quite far afield. The AICPA has even
reached the point of developing a one-minute television spot intended as a public-service
advertisement of the profession. For complete details, see Letter from Martin Rosenberg,
AICPA Staff Assistant, State Society Relations, to state society directors, June 1970, on
file with the Washington Society of Certified Public Accountants.
96. John L. Carey summed up the problem which the profession faces in this area
when he stated:
Few outstanding high school students who are preparing for college are attracted
to accounting as a career at age sixteen or seventeen-partly because their teachers
and guidance counselors don't know how accounting functions in modem society
nor what opportunities it offers for able young people.
Carey, How to Attract Young People, CPA, March 1964, at 4. See also Commission VI-
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increasingly unpopular among students. 9 7 Students who are trained in
accounting are frequently unwilling to undergo the traditional "apprenticeship" as junior accountants,9 8 and many people who do enter
public accounting do so because they regard it as a springboard to
other positions. 99 Finally there is an extremely large personnel turnover in public accounting, 0 and the competition for selected students
between auditors and corporate personnel specialists is frequently a
terribly unbalanced contest.101
The public accounting profession today faces an increasing shortage
of adequately trained personnel to accomplish the current volume of
work. 10 2 A major 1970 study predicts that no change can be anticipated.0 3 An expanded attest function is therefore a practical imposPlacement, American College Personnel Association Study Commission, What ARE the
Attitudes of Students toward Occupations, J. CoLxoE PLACEMENT, Dec. 1966, Jan. 1967,
at 27.
97. The overall enrollment in business courses is not increasing rapidly enough to
meet the demand for graduates. Arnett, The Recruitment Problem: A Proposed Solution,
THE Mrc GAN CPA, Nov-Dec. 1966, at 20. Carey, How to Attract Young People, CPA,
March 1964, at 4. The problem is not only quantitative, however. John Ashworth of the
AICPA's Education Division has noted:
Only accounting, among the four major professions, must recruit from a relatively
mediocre manpower pool because most intelligent high school boys are ignorant
about the opportunities in our business-directed society. Ashworth, Who Wants to
Be a CPA? Not Enough of the Right Students, U.S. Study Finds, CPA, Nov. 1964, at 2.

98. See, e.g., Letter to the Journal, J. AccouNTANCy, July 1968, at 22.
99. A survey of U.C.L.A. graduates found that the most important single factor in
selecting accounting as a collegiate major was the knowledge that the accounting profession would open doors to opportunities in business and government. H. Simons, Education
for Accountancy 27 (1960), cited in Master, Recruiting: A Growing Problem, Tm
FLORIDA CERTIFIED PuBLic ACCoUNTANT, May 1965, at 12.

100. The exact scope of the turnover problem is currently unknown, although a

study of the problem is being conducted, Tm CPA, July-Aug. 1970, at 7. A Seattle

partner in one of the "big eight" public accounting firms indicated that he anticipated
a 15 to 20 percent turnover in the first year alone. Interview with Roger W. Nyquist,
partner in Price, Waterhouse & Co., in Seattle, Washington, April 20, 1970.

101. See J. CAREy, TE CPA PLANs FOR THE FuTURE 293-94 (1965).
102. The current economic situation has had some effect on the demand for accountants. A mid-1970 article in the Seattle Times, June 7, 1970, sec. A, at 1, col. 3, however,
indicated that even in Seattle, one of the areas hardest hit by the economic slump, accountants still stood "almost alone on the 'most wanted' list." On the national level, the Wall
Street Journal reported in the summer of 1970 that "graduates in accounting experienced
only a 7% drop in job offers this spring (1970] compared with a year ago, while the
Offers for all Bachelor's
volume in 10 engineering and science fields plunged 40% ....
degree holders skidded 34% .... " Wall Street J., July 21, 1970, at 1, col. 5.
103. The study concluded:
Accounting beginning salaries have increased and so has the number of accounting
graduates. So also, apparently, has the need for accountants. There is no indication
that new graduate production figures can begin to meet the demand, however.
A review of . . . accounting-indicates that rapidly increasing salaries have not
generally resulted in an increasing supply. Demand is great; salaries are high and
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sibility, and while it appears that everyone desires improved disclosure,
such improvement is completely beyond the auditors' capability.
III.

EFFECTS OF EXPANDED LIABILITY

It appears highly probable that expanded auditors' liability will not
result in either of its stated objectives. A brief examination of the
current economic situation in the auditing market and the changes
which are likely to result from expanded auditors' liability, however,
indicate that the probable failure of expanded liability to accomplish
its stated objectives will be a secondary evil when compared to the new
problems which it will generate.
Effects upon the Auditing Profession
There is an oligopoly among the accounting firms which audit
companies involved in the securities markets.' 014 The oligopoly, however, is not complete; firms other than the big eight perform the audits
for 20 percent of the publicly-held companies,0 5 and probably prepare
an even greater percentage of the registration statements for firms
making an initial public offering.' Furthermore, the oligopoly would
probably not become substantially more complete in the foreseeable
future without the addition of an expanded auditors' liability, because
the smaller firms have a protective weapon in the Code of Professional
Ethics, 01 which impedes the "big eight's" use of their powerful market

A.

apparently going higher; the supply of technically prepared college graduates is not
responding.
Harkness, Beginning Salaries and Reality, J. COLLEGE PLACEZMENT, Feb.-March 1970, at
48, 52.
104. A 1968 study, for example, determined that the "big eight" public accounting
firms performed the audits for 468 of the largest 500 corporations in the United States.
Louis, The Accountants Are Changing the Rules, FORTUNE, June 15, 1968, at 177, 178.
105. Id. at 178-79. This study noted that other auditing firms performed the audits
for four companies even among the top 100 in size. As the size of the client decreases, a
larger proportion of the audits is performed by auditing firms other than the "big eight";
analysis of the June, 1970 Fortune Survey of the Second 500 Largest U.S. Industrial
Companies shows' 70 of these 500 corporations audited by regional or local firms.
106. This seems a reasonable inference from the trend suggested by note 105, supra,
and accompanying text, since firms making initial public offerings are normally relatively
small in comparison to existing publicly-held corporations. A study by Charles Carpenter
and Robert Strawser on the displacement of auditors because of public offerings, scheduled for publication in the June, 1971 J. Accountancy, will likely contain empirical data
on this proposition.
107.

AMERicAN INSTITUTE OF CERTIFED PuBLic AccouNTANTS, CODE or PRomEsSmONA

ETMCS AND INTERPRETIVE OPINIONS (1970).
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positions to pirate clients from smaller competitors.' 08 Because the

giant firms' control is not complete, today's auditing market does not
suffer from either price-fixing or discrimination in services, 0 9 the

abuses which are frequently feared from oligopolies. 10
However, we can anticipate a radically changed situation in the
structure of the accounting industry and in the price and availability

of auditing services as a result of the expansion of auditors' liability.
Expanded auditors' liability is likely to result in complete control of
the audits of large publicly-held corporations by the "big eight," since
even the firms immediately below the "big eight" in size have, under

pressure from expanding liability, considered redirecting their efforts
away from the public sector. A consultant involved in designing a

marketing strategy for one of these firms, for example, has indicated
that the costs"' and exposure'2 of the potential liability accom-

108. See note 107, supra. The oligopoly is partially a function of the structure of the
clients' markets, and some necessary functions are difficult for any but the largest auditing firms to perform for some clients. See, e.g., SA.P. No. 33, supra note 51, at 38, dealing
with observation of inventories. Still, it appears that a substantial portion of the growth
of the oligopolists has come about through merger. See, e.g., Rea, The Purchase, Sale &
Merger of Small Practices, 1966 N.Y. CERTIFIED PUBLIC ACCOUNTANT 579; Farrow,
Mergers by Accountants and Accounting Firms, J. ACCOUNTANCy, May 1967, at 37. With
the apparent movement toward practice in corporate form, see note 50, supra, the merger
movement may run up against section 7 of the Clayton Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 19
(1964), and become a substantially less significant factor.
109. It is still not within the ability of the oligopolists to conspire effectively to fix
prices or discriminate in services because, while they have 80 percent of the publicly-held
companies' business, see note 105, supra, there are numerous other firms which are
desirous and capable of performing the audits now performed by the oligopolists. Any
attempt by the larger firms to employ monopolistic techniques today would find numerous
competitors waiting for the customers discriminated against.
110. See notes 117-118 and accompanying text, infra.
111. It was previously noted that insurance rates and deductible amounts are rising
rapidly. See notes 37-48 and accompanying text, supra. One firm in the "big eight" noted
that even four years ago the defense costs alone for auditors' liability suits were hundreds
of thousands of dollars per year. Wall Street J., Nov. 15, 1966, at 13, col. 3. Because of
the size of the deductible amounts, it is clear that large auditing firms are paying substantial portions of the defense costs out of their own pockets.
The exact amount of these deductible portions is not obtainable, but informed estimates
of these amounts suggest that firms immediately below the big eight in size have deductible
amounts as high as $100,000 for 1971, with increases of up to 300 percent per year over
the recent past. Interview with W. Thomas Porter, Associate Professor of Accounting and
Director of Executive Development Programs at the University of Washington, in
Seattle, Washington, Nov. 26, 1970. The deductible amounts for members of the big
eight may be even higher. Interview with Frederick J. Wonsetler, Partner in Lybrand,
Ross Bros. & Montgomery, in Seattle, Washington, June 24, 1970, and interview with
Richard Y. Glidden, partner in Ernst & Ernst, in Seattle, Washington, June 23, 1970. See
also Weyrich, Exposure to ProfessionalLiability, 1970 N.Y. CERTIEMID PUBLIc ACCOUNTANT
56, 561, where the author, a partner in'the Executive Office of Haskins & Sells, stated
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panying major public audits is the major new factor in the practical
economics of accounting practice." 3 He suggests that a reasonable
marketing strategy under today's conditions should include a deemphasis of the public sector." 4 If the larger regional and local firms
do respond to the current market forces and abandon the public sector,
the oligopolists' share of the market will probably become virtually
complete.
The oligopolists' effective control in the evolving market will also be
substantially greater. Until now, the professional Code of Ethics
solicitation and advertising provisions have apparently slowed the
trend toward oligopoly and preserved the position of the larger competitors of the "big eight" in the public market." 5 If the competitors
abandon the audits, however, the Code of Ethics will effectively entrench the members of the "big eight" beyond recall.
In addition, the audit of publicly-held companies calls for the
maintenance of a large and specialized staff capacity which would
otherwise be unnecessary. Those auditing firms which abandoned the
public market would presumably also dismantle these staffs," 6 and
once disbanded, these staffs would be nearly impossible to reestablish.
As a consequence, the competitors of the "big eight" will be effectively
barred from reentry, and the oligopolists will no longer be restrained
by potential competitors.

that "self-insurance, or the deductible portion under the policies, has grown over 50
times."
112. See notes 26-28 and accompanying text, supra.
113. Interview with W. Thomas Porter, Associate Professor of Accounting and
Director of Executive Development Programs, Univ. of Washington, in Seattle, Washington, July 3, 1970.
The other factors supporting de-emphasis of the audit of publicly-held corporations are:
1) The overhead incurred by maintaining the staff specialization required to perform
audits for major corporate clients;
2) The stiff competition from both the giant firms and the other major regional and
local firms in this area.
3) The possibility that servicing problems would develop as the client enlarged, and
that the client might be lost as it grew in any event.
Id.
All of these factors have existed for many years, but, by themselves, they were not
enough to necessitate the abandonment of the public sector, at least among firms of
substantial size.
114. Id.
115. See notes 107-108 and accompanying text, supra.
116. See note 113, supra. The high cost of maintaining this staff capability is one of
the factors inducing the auditing firms to abandon the public sector.
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B. Effects on the Auditing Market
The effects of an unrestrained oligopoly are likely to be felt in the
form of price-fixing and discrimination in service," 7 and, ominously,
expanded auditor's liability will also bring even more direct pressures
to bear on both the price and availibility of audits.
1.

Price
Two separate forces, both due to expanded liability, will act to raise
prices. First, a price rise will probably result from the self-elimination
of the competitors of the "big eight" from the public sector. The pressures toward maintaining competitive prices will be replaced by strong
temptations toward tight, monopoly-like pricing 11 8 when the "big
eight" find themselves without any substantial competition. In a market characterized by a shortage of auditors, such a pricing strategy will
probably evolve rather quickly. Second, a further price increment will
result from the fact that at least part of the costs of the expanded
auditors' liability will be passed on in the form of higher auditing fees.
Users of auditors' services will pay more because of the increased risk
to the auditors even though no increased service seems probable.
2.

Availibility
A drastic change in the availability of audits can also be anticipated.
Even among the firms which remain in the market for auditing of
publicly-held companies, rational business judgment would sometimes
call for a refusal to perform audits for those clients which are in danger
of collapse or diminution in value 119 There is already evidence that
117. Price and "output," in this case, services, are the factors in maximizing profit:
in an unrestrained oligopoly, both are within the control of the oligopolists. See, e.g.,
L. RFa.nODs, EcoNomacs, A G=Rna. INTRODUCTION 146-56 (1963); 3. B~mx, INDusTIL

ORGAN

ATION

266-98 (1959).

118. Under monopolistic pricing, the concept of marginal revenue will result in
quantity being limited to the amount where marginal revenue of an additional unit will
not exceed its marginal cost, and the price for the service being based upon the demand
level for that restricted quantity. This pricing technique enables a monopolist to achieve
a higher level of prices and profits while providing less service. See, e.g., L. RvNoLns,

EcoNOIncs, A

GEaNRAL INTRoDUCTION

142-47 (1963),

3.

BAwN, INDusTRiAL

ORGANI-ATION

266-98 (1959).

119. A recent article in the journal of Accountancy encouraged just such a policy. In
a list of requirements which should be met before a CPA accepts a new client, the article

includes a competent staff and good financial condition. Moore, Selecting New Clients,
J. AccouNTANcy, March 1970, at 78. Moreover, it can be anticipated that insurers will
amplify the pressures in this direction still further, as the scope of the risk appears to be
directly proportional to the financial stability of the audited company. See note 5, supra.
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some accounting firms, including members of the "big eight," are
considering abandoning questionable clients out of self-protection, 20
and the shortage of auditors again suggests that the public accountants
will not be loathe to sacrifice the business.
Even without the previously discussed reduction in the number of
auditing firms, the trend toward abandonment of clients by some firms
would represent a serious problem, but the problem is compounded by
the prospect of a complete oligopoly in auditing. In a market with essentially only eight highly sophisticated firms, all having the same
insurers, it seems reasonable to predict that the firms would use similar
standards in making their choice among prospective clients, and that
many firms would be denied an audit altogether.
C.

Additional Effects on the Economy
The elimination of numerous auditing firms from the public sector,
the imposition of unproductive increases in auditing costs, and the
reduction in availability of audits would be serious enough if they occurred in a vacuum. Unfortunately, this is not the case, and the evolving
market will probably have some further effects on the economy.' 2 '
120. Interview with Frederick J. Wonsetler, a Seattle partner in Lybrand, Ross Bros.
& Montgomery, in Seattle, Washington, June 24, 1970. As the policy is now formulated
the emphasis is on questioning the continued audits of firms involved in questionable as
opposed to merely unprofitable business practices.
121. The analysis in this section presumes a relatively unfettered capitalistic economy,
but the American economy is subject to regulation in numerous areas, and one set of
regulations, the antitrust acts, see the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1964), and the
Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27 (1964), was aimed particularly at discrimination in price
and service. J. VANCISE, UNDERSTANDING T= ANTITRUST LAWS 34 (1970). See generally
S. MARCUS, COMPETITION AND THE LAW (1967).
Moreover, a professional code of ethics restricting competition, see Associated Press v.
United States, 326 U.S. 1, 8 (1945), United States v. National Ass'n of Real Estate Bds.,
339 U.S. 485 (1950), J. VANCISE, supra, at 222-23, or continuous intercourse among
competitors, as through professional societies, J. VANCISE, supra, at 155-58, are market
characteristics which the antitrust acts have sometimes reached.
It appears, however, that the antitrust acts may not be applicable to the evolving
auditing market. First, public accounting firms may not be subject to the antitrust acts.
There are doubts that the antitrust acts are applicable to oligopolistic markets. KoTTXE,
ANTITRUST AND MONOPOLY SUBCOMM. OF THE SENATE JUDICIARY Comm. ADMINISTERED
PRICES, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 182 (Comm. Print 1963); S. MARCUS, supra at 134-38.

Moreover, the Securities Acts have been held to impliedly repeal the antitrust acts in
some areas. Silver v. New York Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341, 357 (1963). But cf. United
States v. Morgan, 118 F. Supp. 621 (S.D.N.Y. 1953). It is certainly not clear that the
antitrust acts cannot apply to auditing firms, however. See American Medical Ass'n
v. United States, 317 U.S. 519 (1943), United States v. Oregon State Medical Soc'y, 343
U.S. 326 (1952), AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF CERTIFIED PuBsLc ACCOUNTANTS, CODE OF
PROFESSIONAL ETHICS AND INTERPRETIVE OPINioNS 5 n.* (1970).
Second, even if the antitrust acts were deemed applicable to the auditors, all of the
statutory and judicially evolved defenses under those acts would have to be overcome. For

702

Auditor's Liability

1. Effect on Capital Users and Resource Allocation
The capitalistic economic system depends upon credit to allocate
capital resources among competing potential investments.'2 2 The corporation was developed to enable the accumulation of investment

capital from diverse sources for a single user, 123 and the securities

markets124 are the main channel facilitating that accumulation.2 5 All

participation in the securities markets, unless one of the extremely
limited exceptions under the securities acts is utilized,'26 requires

audited financial statements. 27

example, price differentials are tolerated under the Clayton Antitrust Act to the extent
of legitimate cost differentials in serving the customer, and the auditors would probably be
able to satisfy even the present stringent requirements for segregation of costs in respect
to insurance and hours, J. VANCIsE, supra, at 151-52, thereby insulating their cost differentials from attack under that act.
Finally, even if the antitrust acts could be applied to auditors and the auditing market,
their application to that market would be relatively ineffective; the increased risks of
liability, with their increased costs and the shortage of personnel in auditing, are not
antitrust problems, and even the traditional antitrust problem of lack of competition
could not be solved through the remedies available under the antitrust acts. Removing
impediments to competition such as the Code of Ethics or potential sources of restraints
of trade or discrimination such as professional societies will not solve the overwhelming
problem of the lack of willing competitors. Divestiture and orders to operate do not
seem effective tools when the smaller organizations do not want to participate in the
industry, even if the rather thorny problems of dividing up what are essentially partnership organizations could be solved. In sum, where legal doctrines and market forces rather
than conscious action by competitors are the causative agents, the antitrust acts are not
an effective corrective tool. United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295
(D. Mass. 1953), aff'd, 347 U.S. 521 (1954). See also 21 CONG. REC. 3152 (1890).
122. J. SCHUMPETER, THE THEORY Or ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 68-69 (1934).
Capital is intended to flow to those enterprises which can earn the highest rate of
return, since theoretically they will be willing to pay the highest price for that capital.
That rate of return reflects demand in the marketplace for the commodities produced
by the enterprise.
123. T. COCHRAN, BASIC HISTORY oF AatERICAN BusrNESs 41 (1959).
124. This analysis applies to both the "primary" and "secondary" securities markets.
The primary market refers to the channels which handle the initial sales of securities
by issuers; the secondary market refers to the channels which facilitate later sales of
securities between investors. The latter is of equal significance to the security issuer, as
initial investments would be difficult to induce if the investor were locked in. See generally
R. JOHNSON, FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT (2d ed. 1962); C. GERSTENBERG, FINANCIAL ORGANIZATION AND MANAGEMENT OF BusINEss 213-81 (4th rev. ed. 1959); 3. BOGEN, FINANCIAL
HANDBOOK, 9-1 through 10-58 (4th ed. 1964). See also 1 SECURITES & EXCHANGE COMMISSioN, REPORT OF T'3E SPECIAL STUDY OF THE SECuRiTIEs MARKETS 10 (1963) [herein-

after cited as 1 SEC MARKET STUDY]. The authors there point out that there is a
tremendous public interest in the continued efficient operation of those markets.
125. The securities markets are not the only source of outside capital for corporations.
Banks and related lending institutions also provide funds, usually for shorter periods
than are involved in the securities markets, but these lenders, too, almost without exception require audits today for any major loans. See generally CORPORATE FINANCIAL
REPORTING: CONFLICTS AND CHALLENGES (3. Burton ed. 1969). Moreover, in most
respects the economic arguments made regarding the securities markets are also applicable
to these capital sources.
126. A detailed analysis of these exceptions and exemptions is beyond the scope of this
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As audits become more expensive and less universally available,
therefore, the credit system will become less efficient in performing its
functions. The cumulative effects of the evolving auditing market may
significantly impede the allocation of capital resources within and between some sectors of the economy.
2. Effects of Rising Prices
For the majority of publicly-held corporations, a higher audit price
without increased return will merely be wasteful. 12' For at least two
types of corporations, however, the situation will be substantially more
serious.
Auditing fees are not a strictly variable cost which increases proportionately with the size of the audited business entity. A larger number
of auditing hours per dollar of assets is necessary for the audit of
smaller firms, so those firms pay a larger relative amount for their
audits than do larger firms. 129 As auditing fees increase, therefore, even

if the increases are strictly pro-rata hourly rate increases, the difference in percentage of total expenses represented by the auditing bills of
paper; it is sufficient to note that they are limited and sometimes hazardous. See generally
R. JENNINGS & H. MaRSH, SECURITIES REGULATIONS CASES AND MATERIALS (2d ed. 1968).

127. SEC Reg. S-X, 17 C.F.R. § 210 (1950) states the requirements as to form and
content of all financial statements, with some limited exceptions, filed under the federal
securities acts. § 210.2 makes certification of financial statements by an independent
auditor a requirement for all financial statements subject to the regulation, and under
the terms of § 8 of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77h (1933), and § 19 of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78s (1934), the SEC has the power to prevent sale of a new issue of securities or to suspend trading in previously issued securities,
if the regulations under those acts are not satisfied or if it appears that material facts are
misstated. The actual practices of the Commission are somewhat more informal than the
statutes would indicate, but if the registration statements required by the Securities Act
of 1933 do not satisfy Regulation S-X, the SEC will refuse to accelerate the effective
date of the registration statement, see, e.g., Wall Street J., June 19, 1968, at 4, col. 3,
thereby effectively destroying the marketing of the new issue of securities because of the
practical impossibility of pricing the issue 20 days in advance of initial sale, and if the
reports required by the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 do not satisfy that regulation, and
are not corrected to the SEC's satisfaction, that Commission will eventually stop trading
in the securities of the company. Interview with Mac Nelson, a manager with Ernst &
Ernst, in Seattle, Washington, September 18, 1970. For a case study of a suspension of
trading, based upon financial statements, under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, see
Rappaport, Accounting and the S.E.C., N.Y. CERTaIED PUBLIC ACCOUNTANT, Jan. 1963,
at 54-55.
128. This is not strictly true, as the overall return available from investments in
corporate securities is a major determinant of the amount of resources which will flow
into the capital market. If that return is reduced across the board, more resources will
be employed in other areas, such as consumption. See, e.g., A. ALcniAN & W. ALLEN,
UNIVERSITY ECONOMICS chs. 15, 29, 33 (1964).
129. SECURITIES & EXCHANGE COMMISSION, COST Or FLOTATION, 1951-1955, cited in

Benston, in Manne, supra note 9, at 62.
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13 0
large and small firms will become even more disproportionate.

Expanded auditors' liability, however, will not create only pro-rata
rate increases. Although everyone will pay substantially more for
audits, the "high risk" firms will probably pay a disproportionate

premium 31 Unfortunately, the "high risk" firms will also frequently
be the smaller firms within a given industry,' 32 and in such cases both
of the factors suggested in the paragraph will combine to inflict a competitive disadvantage, in the form of a higher cost of capital, upon

those smaller firms.
Perhaps even more important than the effect upon competition
within established industries, however, is the probable disproportionate
rise in the cost of capital between different industries. On the whole,
new business ventures and industries are smaller and riskier than
older, established firms and industries, 33 but in many cases it is the
newer, innovative concerns which are offering the products which are
most demanded by the economy. 3 4 A larger rise in the cost of capital
of the new, innovative concerns will cripple the ability of the credit
market to allocate resources to more desired products.' 35

130. Id. In the early 1950's the percentage of proceeds expended for auditing services
for newly placed debt issues below $1 million was 143/z times as great as the percentage
for debt issues over $20 million, and as auditing costs have increased substantially in the
interim, the disproportion in percentages is probably substantially greater now. For an
indication of the increase in auditing prices, compare Wheat & Blackstone, Guideposts
for a First Public Offering, 15 Bus. LAwER 539 (1960) and Blackstone, Epilogue:PostEffective Amendment to Guideposts for a First Public Offering, in AmawcAN BAR AssoCrATzox, SELECTE ARTIcrs oN FEnERAL SEcuRaTs LAw 27 (1968). These articles
indicate that the average absolute auditing cost for a small issue doubled in the early
1960's alone.
131. The commentators who argued for expanded liability of auditors to users of
financial statements believed that the cost of adequate insurance coverage against auditors'
liability could be spread evenly across the entire economy through increases in the standard auditing fee. See, e.g., 41 ST. JoHN's L. REv., supra note 29, at 598. But there is no
reason to believe that this will actually occur. Different firms will present different degrees
of risk to auditors, and it is reasonable to presume that any identifiable overhead costs,
such as increased insurance rates, which result from the audit of a particular client will
be charged to that client, rather than pro-rated. If this approach were not adopted,
another auditing firm with a "safer" mix of clients could charge a lower rate and theoretically accumulate all of the safer clients.
132. 1 SEC MARE:ET STIDY, supra note 124, at 504.
133. Id.
134. Apparently, these same firms are already taking a beating because of the securities
acts policies. Concern over this situation, even without the additional impediment of
astronomical auditing fees, has been reflected in the formation and operations of the
Small Business Administration. Friend, The SEC and the Economic Performance of
Securities Markets, in Manne, supra note 9, at 192 n.7.
136. It is currently impossible to predict the absolute amount of the increase in
auditing costs or the extent of the disproportion in costs of capital among different firms.
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3. Effects of Restricted Availability
While doubts might be raised as to the significance of the priceincrease effects upon the economy, the effects of limited availability of
audits are more certain. A firm deemed overly risky and denied an
audit" 6 will be denied access to the security markets. 37 Some of the
firms denied this access to the securities markets might well have been
poor investments.' 38 This is not universally true, however, and the
innovative concern with an untried management, an untried product
and a shortage of capital would undoubtedly be hard hit.

3

The

securities markets were developed to supply the capital needs of just
such firms; in barring these firms from their credit channels, we would
have effectively prevented exactly what the securities markets were
developed to promote.
4. Effects on Investors
It is difficult to generalize about investors, but three observations
seem appropriate. First, since it appears that the anticipated benefits
to be derived from expanded auditors' liability will not materialize,
any of the costs associated with that expanded liability which fall upon
the users of financial statements will be a net loss to those investors. 4

Until now, auditing fees have been a relatively minor expense even for smaller firms,
and it is possible that the effects of price increases, except in the more extreme cases,
will not deal too severe a blow to the resource allocation capability of the economy. A very
rough approximation of this expense as a percentage of proceeds for smaller public issues
today would put the audit fees at approximately /3's of one percent. This figure is
evolved by presuming the lowest suggested auditing fee for a new public offering in
Blackstone, supra note 130, at 27, $5,000., and applying that figure to an offering of
$750,000. If this figure were accurate, it would represent a doubling of the percentage of
proceeds necessary for auditing on a small issue since the early 1950's. SEcURITrES &
EXCHANGE COMMISSION,

COST OF FLOTATION, 1951-1955

(1957),

supra note 129. It is

apparent that the principal cost of such an issue is still the underwriting compensation.
Id. See also 1 SEC MARKET STUDY, supra note 124, at 502.
136. The same is true of those firms whose auditors issue opinions unacceptable to the
SEC purely because of an excess of caution by the auditor. Qualified opinions can have
all of the effects suggested in note 127, supra. Interview with Mac Nelson, manager with
Ernst & Ernst, in Seattle, Washington, September 18, 1970.
137. See note 127, supra.
138. Some states, such as California, would apparently take the position that extreme
risk alone is sufficient to prevent the sale of the securities. R. JENNINGS & H. MARSH,
supra note 126, at 526-28.
139. The problems would by no means be limited to such firms, however. Even the
largest and best established firms can encounter difficulties where they require immediate
access to large amounts of capital. See Wall Street J., July 3, 1970, at 16, col. 1. These
firms, too, could find that the capital markets were closed to them at the moment they
needed them the most, due to auditors' gunshyness.
140. See note 24, supra.
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Second, not all users of financial statements desire only limited risk
investment; some investors prefer higher risk enterprises, with their
commensurately higher rate of return. 141 These investors will find,
however, that the evolving auditing market will completely eliminate
part of the high-risk investments through the denial of an audit, and
will reduce the rate of return from the investments remaining at the
riskier end of the spectrum through disproportionate auditing charges.
Finally, it is possible that in the short-run, as auditing firms abandon
clients out of self-protection, or raise rates, less competent or less
reputable auditors will pick up the clientele. While this seems relatively unlikely,142 if it did occur the users would find that expanded
liability had resulted in poorer, rather than improved, disclosure, and
reduced, rather than increased, assurance from the audit.
CONCLUSION
Legal analysts in recent years have advocated an expanded auditors'
liability to users of financial statements, with the dual objectives of
improved disclosure to all investors and compensation of those who are
injured. Unfortunately, it appears that the liability will not achieve
either of its stated objectives. Instead, the liability will probably cause
severe damage to the users of capital, the suppliers of that capital, the
auditing profession, and the resource-allocating ability of the economy.
Consequently, an expanded auditors' liability should be rejected, and
the legal standard which permitted the accounting profession to develop the audit to today's level of assurance to investors should be
reaffirmed.
Joseph P. Dawson*
141. For an economist's analysis of the effects of risk upon the securities markets,
see Lintner, A Model of a Perfectly Functioning Securities Market, in Manne, supra note
9, at 143.
142. While regulations such as SEC Reg. S-X, 17 C.F.R. § 210 (1971) do not provide
authority to evaluate the competence and honesty of auditors in advance of their giving
opinions as to statements, it is probable that the SEC, the exchanges, or the underwriters
would effectively minimize this risk through informal channels.
* Member Washington Soc'y of C.P.A's, BA. 1967, J.D. 1971, University of Washington.
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